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In this paper, we present a model for the marketability of a Tribal artwork and we test 
this model empirically using a unique hand-collected dataset, which comprises the 
worldwide Tribal art market auctions between 1999 and 2008. Our results show a sig-
nificant relationship between the probability of an artwork to be sold and several signs 
and signals. The effect of the auction estimated prices on the probability of sales is 
nonlinear, and allows us to divide the Tribal art market into two price regimes. In the 
low-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is 
negative. In the high-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the 
probability of sales is positive. 
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1 – Introduction 
In any artwork, economic and cultural-artistic aspects coexist. The economic aspect is encapsulated in the 
artwork price. However, a “fundamental” price is hard to define because artworks do not have any direct 
production costs (Baumol and William, 1966; Baumol, 1986). The cultural-artistic aspect is expressed in 
“quality” which is also difficult to define. As Caves (2000) states, the principle of “nobody knows” usually 
applies to the art context. 
When a piece of art is traded on the market, the players have several information sets (Tirole, 1988; Candela 
and Scorcu, 2004; Ginsburgh and Throsby, 2006; Rasmusen, 2006): 
i.  Symmetric information, if all agents have an equal and complete information; 
ii.  Asymmetric information, if one of the agents - usually the seller - has an information advantage; 
iii.  Symmetric disinformation, if both agents have an equal but incomplete set of information. 
When the condition of symmetric dis/information holds, the agents agree on the same evaluation of the art-
work. However, both symmetric information and symmetric disinformation do not happen frequently. The 
condition of asymmetric information is more common. When this condition exists, the quality of the artwork 
may be indicated by signs and signals intrinsic to the work which drive the supply and the demand on the 
market
1 (Candela et al., 2009). 
Signs can be described as “observable” and “unalterable” characteristics that belong to the artwork itself. 
Some examples of signs in the world of art are: technique; iconography; materials; style; and concept in 
Conceptual art. 
Signals can be described as “interpretable” characteristics that agents exchange on the market. Common sig-
nals in the world of art are: authenticity certification (issued by artists themselves, dealers, experts, or seller 
associations); exhibitions; documents issued by archives and foundations; and annotated catalogs. 
It is worth noting that, unlike signs, not all signals allow players to discriminate the quality of an artwork. It 
is thus convenient to differentiate signals into two categories (Akerlof, 1970; Stigler, 1971; Spence, 1973): 
i.  Separating signals allow the market players to recognize the quality of an artwork, leading to a mar-
ket separating equilibrium
2. 
ii.  Pooling signals do not help the players recognize this quality, leading to a market pooling equilibri-
um
3. 
In the Western and Tribal art markets, players must rely on different signs and signals to evaluate the quality 
of an artwork. In the Western art market, the quality of a piece of artwork can be understood through its cer-
tification
4. In the Tribal art market, artwork quality is difficult to decode for several reasons. The first reason 
is that an effective system of certification is missing. There is usually a lack of historical information – most-
ly due to a lack of written sources and an inadequate provenance cataloging – and there is not a shared defi-
nition of the meaning of authenticity itself in this context (Fraser, 1962; Kerchache et al. 1988; Bargna, 
2000; Steiner, 2001; Ciminelli, 2008). Furthermore, the countries of origin – mainly Africa and Oceania – do 
not actively protect the originality of their Tribal art. Additionally, the problem of evaluating quality is com-
plicated by artist anonymity. While in the Western art the artist name is usually known and is accepted as a 
guarantee of the artwork quality, in Tribal art the artist name is almost never known. Therefore, in the Tribal 
art market signs and signals are especially important in helping players recognize the quality of the artwork. 
It is important to emphasize that the distinction between signs and signals can be directly inferred from the 
auction catalogs of Tribal art, which distinguish between unalterable characteristics (signs) and features that 
constitute an expression of “pedigree” (signals). Signs are easily observable and include Continent of origin, 
material, and type of artwork
5. Signals, often called the pedigree of a Tribal artwork, refer to the effective 
                                                      
1 In creating our model, we borrowed the commonly used art market terminology “signs” and “signals”, which we 
transformed into empirical criteria for analysis. Streb (2006) takes a similar approach when he applied the same termi-
nology to the job market. Both signaling theory and practice are related to the more general literature on the signaling 
theory, which has its theoretical foundation in Spence (1973).  
2 In a separating equilibrium, sellers with different quality artworks choose to provide different signals or no signals. 
3 In a pooling equilibrium, sellers with different quality artworks may choose to provide the same signal. 
4 Hammer prices and auction estimated prices can be found on the Internet as well as in printed catalogs for both West-
ern and Tribal art markets. 
5 Different signs justify different collecting forms, e.g. African art collections or Oceanic art collection.  
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tribal use of the artwork itself
6 and include patina, specific references in publications or specialized catalogs, 
museum or special exhibitions and historicization. The description of an artwork in an auction catalog is, in-
deed, divided into two distinct sections: the first section presents the signs; the second section contains the 
signals
7. Thus, the distinction between signs and signals – which is evident also in terms of typographic for-
matting in the catalogs – reflect an established market practice and deserves to be studied empirically
8. 
In this paper, we investigate these aspects from a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. First, we propose a 
model to explain the marketability of a piece of Tribal art (the probability that it will be sold). Second, we 
test this model using a unique hand-collected dataset, which includes the worldwide Tribal art market auc-
tions between 1999 and 2008. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model to explain the marketability of an artwork. 
Section 3 describes a unique hand-collected dataset, which includes the worldwide Tribal art market auctions 
between 1999 and 2008. In section 4, we test the model using this dataset and comment on the results. Sec-
tion 5 improves our analysis dividing the Tribal art market into two price regimes. Section 6 presents some 
checks of robustness for our empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
2 – Theoretical setup 
In this section, we set up a model to explain the marketability of an artwork. The trades of Tribal artworks 
may occur in three markets: the primary market; the secondary market; the tertiary market. In the primary 
market, artworks are sold by creators or procurer to collectors, dealers and galleries. In the secondary market, 
artworks are sold from galleries to collectors and investors. Finally, the tertiary market is the auction market 
(Scorcu, 2007). We focus on the tertiary market and specifically on Tribal artwork trades that are mediated 
by auction houses. The players in Tribal art auctions are bidders, sellers, and auctioneers. Bidders and sellers 
are generally private and institutional collectors and investors. Lastly, auctioneers are pure intermediaries be-
tween the bidder demand and the seller supply
9.  
Consider an independent private value auction and a finite and numerable set B  of bidders for an artwork  j  
(Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Maskin and Riley, 1984; Ashenfelter, 1989). 
Each bidder has a reservation price, which represents the maximum price that she is willing to pay for the 
artwork. Define  jb p  as the bidder  B bÎ  reservation price for the Tribal artwork  j . Since bidders do not 
know the quality of an artwork with certainty, they use signs and signals to set their reservation prices. Thus, 
jb p  is a function of  N  signs included in the vector n, and  M  signals included in the vector m. Bidders 
can find these signs and signals on the pre-auction catalogs.  
Each seller has a secret reservation price, which represents the minimum price that she is willing to accept to 
sell the artwork. Define the seller’s reservation price on  j  as  j v .  j v  is exogenous and not observable by 
bidders, and depends on the seller’s private information on the quality of the artwork. Therefore, both the 
seller and the auctioneer know  j v  – since  j v  is common information between them – but the bidder does 
not know it. However, it is possible to infer  j v  from the observation of the auction estimated price,  j s , 
which is published on the pre-auction catalogs
10. In fact, an artwork is placed in an auction only if the seller’s 
reservation price,  j v , is less than the auction estimated price,  j s . In other words, as commercial practice, the 
                                                      
6 In Tribal art, the pedigree has the same function as the certification in Western art. Both pedigree and certification can 
be used as a market measure of the quality of an artwork. 
7 See for example Christie’s catalog. 
8 The total value of sales in the Tribal Art auctions from 1999 to 2008 is 162,022 million euros. In 2007, Sotheby's 
(NY) sold a Benin sculpture (Africa, 1500) for about 3.5 million euros (top lot in our dataset). 
9 The Tribal art market is geographically concentrated in a few venues where the main auctions take place: e.g., New 
York and Paris (Scorcu, 2007). For a description of how art auctions work, see Beggs and Graddy (2009); Ashenfelter 
and Graddy (2003).  
10 Besides the artwork description, auction houses publish low- and a high-price estimate for each Tribal artwork in 
their pre-auction catalogs. “The auction houses observe an unwritten rule that the published low estimate is set at or 
above the secret reserve price” (Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2003, p. 1028). Ashenfelter (1989) shows that the average of 
the auctioneer’s high and low estimate is very highly correlated with the hammer price.   
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auction  estimated  price  is  set  above  the  seller’s  secret  reservation  price.  Formally,  j j j s v s = ,  with 
j j " < < , 1 0 s . In addition, we assume that s  is on average the same for each artwork, so that  j j s v s = . 
The auction house and the bidder set  j s  based on the seller’s private information. Since bidders know  j s  
through pre-auction catalogs before the auction takes place, from their standpoint this auction estimated price 
can be modeled as an exogenous variable. 
An artwork is sold only if the bidder’s reservation price is greater than the seller’s secret reservation price 
(which is known to the auction house). The difference between these two prices is the propensity of an art-
work to be traded
11: the greater the difference, the greater the propensity of an artwork to be traded. Formal-
ly, we indicate the propensity of a Tribal artwork,  j , to be traded as 
 
( ) j jb j s p y s - = m n,
* .  [1] 
 
If at least one bidder’s reservation price is greater than or equal to the seller’s reservation price  
( 0
* ³ j y ), then the trade occurs. The opposite applies if  0
* < j y . Since  j s  is exogenous, any change in n or 
m generates a variation in 
*
j y  only through  jb p . 
Based on the theoretical framework presented, several interesting predictions can be made. 
On one hand, all signs included in n affect 
*
j y  ( n
n





), since they are unalterable characteristics of 
the artwork. On the other hand, signal m, included in m, affects 
*
j y  only if it is credible for the bidder
12. In 
particular, we can distinguish two cases: 










y j ) and we have a market separating equilibrium; 










y j ) and we have a market pooling 
equilibrium. 
To make these predictions operational in an empirical testable model, we suggest a linear equation for the 
propensity of an artwork to be traded 
 
j j j j j u s y + - + = s   m ν n ' '
* ,  [2] 
 
where ν  and   are vectors of parameters and  j u  is an error component. 
Clearly, 
*
j y  is an unobservable latent variable, since it deals with bidders’ reservation prices. Indeed, in in-
dependent value private auctions, there is no observable proxy for these reservation prices. Assume, though, 
that we can observe  j y , a dichotomous variable that indicates if the trade on the artwork  j  takes place.  j y  









0   if   0









  [3] 
 
                                                      
11 The expression “propensity to be traded” has an econometrical connotation and is used to define the concept of “mar-
ketability”. The term “marketability” relates to Menger’s probabilistic analysis of demand (Menger, 1871; Streissler, 
1973). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
12 A signal is credible if it provides accurate information and allows players to identify the quality of the artwork in a 
separating equilibrium.  
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Since we know the outcome of the transaction (the value of  j y ), we can estimate the probability that 
0
* ³ j y . As a matter of fact, we observe  1 = j y  (the trade occurs) if and only if  0
* ³ j y  (i.e., the propensity 
of an artwork to be traded is non-negative) and  0 = j y  (the trade does not occur) if and only if  0
* < j y  (i.e., 
the propensity of an artwork to be traded is negative). Formally
13, 
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
( ) j j j
j j j
j j j









- + £ - =
³ + - + =
³ = =
  m ν n
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0 ' ' Pr
0 Pr , , | 1 Pr
*
,
  [4] 
 
where  () . F  is the distribution function of u  (given the symmetry of u )
14. Clearly, any control variables can 
be included in a vector c. In this case, the probability that  0
* ³ j y  becomes  ( ) j j j j s s - + + κ c   m ν n ' ' ' F . 
Starting from this model, in the next sections we set up our empirical analysis of the Model [4]. 
3 – Database description 
We base our empirical analysis on a unique worldwide dataset we collected from the archives of TAP (Tribal 
Art Price)
15. Our dataset consists of 11,811 outcomes of Tribal art auctions. For each artwork  j , we observe 
the auction outcome (traded vs. non-traded), some item-specific and market-specific signs, signals, control 
variables, and the auction estimated price. 
In what follows, we propose a short description of the variables we use in the following regression analysis. 
Table 1 (part A and part B) reports some descriptive statistics for these variables. 
 
Response variable 
j y  
Traded  is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the artwork is traded and zero 
otherwise. It corresponds to the variable  j y  in our model. 68.6% percent 
of the auctions in our dataset ends up with the artwork being traded. 
   
Covariates   
Signals 
j m  
Patina  is a dummy variable equal to one if the artwork has a patina and zero oth-
erwise. Patina is a film on the surface of an artwork produced by age, oxi-
dation, or any such acquired change of a surface through exposure and use. 
Thus, patina is a qualitative variable of a Tribal artwork, which often offers 
a “proof of a genuine use in time”. For this reason, in our paper, we consid-
er patina as a proxy for “antiquity”. However, patina is not always a trust-
worthy signal, because it is relatively easy to falsify. In our dataset, 53.1% 
of artworks present patina.  
Bibliography  is a dummy variable equal to one if the artwork has been cited in special-
ized bibliography and zero otherwise. Bibliography can be considered as a 
proxy for “notoriety”. However, also this signal may be non-credible since 
not all publications are authoritative. Bibliography is almost equally dis-
tributed between artworks. In fact, 56.2% of artworks have specific refer-
                                                      
13 There are several applications of this approach in the literature of economics of the art. Probit-like models are used to 
predict whether an artwork is sold or remains unsold. However, the focus of these studies is the hammer price and not 
the probability of sales itself. See for example Beggs A. and Graddy K. (2009), Collins A. et al. (2009) and the refer-
ence therein. 
14 This formalization can be found in any microeconometrics textbook, see for example Wooldridge (2002) and Ver-
beek (2008). 
15 A restricted version of this dataset open to the public is available at http://www.tribalartprice.it.  
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ences in publications. 
Exhibitions  is a dummy variable equal to one if the artwork has been exposed in per-
manent or temporary exhibitions and zero otherwise. This variable is also 
used as a proxy for notoriety. This signal can be non-credible, since not all 
exhibitions verify the quality of the artwork they expose. Most artwork in 
our database has been exposed (88.7%). 
Historicization  is a dummy variable equal to one if the Tribal artwork has a document cer-
tifying the time of withdrawal from its country of origin and its commercial 
story (e.g., who has removed it and collected, who has bought and sold it) 
and zero otherwise. Historicization is variable strictly bounded to antiquity 
and notoriety, that certifies the consensus among experts on the importance 
of the artwork. For this reason, this signal is probably the hardest to falsify. 
Most artwork in our dataset exhibit this characteristic (74.2%). 
Signs 
j n  
Continent effect  is a set of 4 dummy variables indicating the Continent of origin: Africa, 
America, Eurasia, and Oceania. The Continent selected as a benchmark 
and, hence, excluded from the regression equation is Africa. A joint Wald 
test on all the coefficients should evidence any Continent effect on our re-
sponse variable
16. In our dataset, most artworks are African (65.3%). 
Item effect   is a set of 12 dummy variables indicating the type of artwork. A full list can 
be found in Table 1. The item selected as a benchmark and, hence, exclud-
ed from the regression equation is clothes. Sculptures are the more com-
mon type of item in our database (35.2%). 
Material effect  is a set of 12 dummy variables indicating the material of the artwork. A full 
list can be found in the Table 1. The material selected as a benchmark and, 
hence, excluded from the regression equation is silver. Wooden artwork is 
more frequently treated than other pieces in our dataset (59%) 
Auction estimated price  
j s  
AEP  is the natural logarithm of the Auction (mean) Estimated Price (AEP from 
now on)
17. AEP is the only continue variable in our dataset. The logarith-
mic transformation mitigates the distributional skewness and the great vari-
ability in AEP. In fact, the distribution of the transformed variable is quite 
symmetric and unimodal. 
Control variables 
j c  
Venue  is a set of 3 dummy variables indicating the market place of the auction. 
The 3 venues considered are New York, Paris and Zurich. The venue se-
lected as a benchmark and, hence, excluded from the regression equation is 
New York. New York is also the venue where most of auctions are held 
(49.5%). 
Year effect  is a set of 12 dummy variables indicating the year of the auction. The years 
from 1998 to 2009 are considered. The year selected as a benchmark and, 
hence, excluded from the regression equation is 1998. Most of the auctions 
took place between 2004 and 2005 (22.3% in total). 
4 – Results 
In this section, we analyze the probability of each artwork in our dataset to be sold. Let  j x  denote the full 
vector of covariates including all signs, signals, control variables, and the auction estimated price. Let  j y  
                                                      
16 We use joint Wald tests for all signs and for the Year effect. 
17 AEP is the average between the minimum and the maximum auction estimated prices. The correlation among mini-
mum, maximum and mean estimated price (in level and logarithmic form) is greater than 0.99. Furthermore, the same 
result applies to the correlation between nominal and real AEPs (in level and logarithmic form). Thus, from an empiri-
cal standpoint, it does not really matter which price is used for the regression analysis.  
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denote  our  response  variable,  then  the  probability  that  1 = j y   (the  artwork  is  traded)  is 
( ) ( ) β x x j j j y ' F | 1 Pr = = , for a given choice of  () . F . β  is a vector of parameter including s  and all the 
parameters in  ν ,    and  κ . If we choose  () . F  to be the standard normal distribution function, so that 














' | 1 Pr
2 ' β x
β x x
p
, we get the Probit model
18. 
Looking at the results in Table 2 (Model 1), we see that the signs are all significant in explaining the proba-
bility of an artwork to be sold (joint Wald-tests for each sign effect are reported at the bottom of each mod-
el). This is an expected result, since signs are unalterable characteristics. On the other hand, this is not true 
for signals. In fact, not all of them lead to a market separating equilibrium. However, this may also be due to 
a model misspecification. In fact, the effect of the AEP on the response variable may be nonlinear and all es-
timates may be affected by this misspecification. 
To test the non-linearity hypothesis, we consider a semiparametric extension of our Probit model, in which 
the response variable is an unknown function of the AEPs conditional to all the other covariates. We can use 
regression splines to estimate this function from the data (Hastie et al.). We omit the summary of this semi-
parametric regression model, as the coefficients on the spline basis are not easy to interpret. However, at the 
bottom of the Model 1, we report a Wald-test statistics, which rejects the null hypothesis of linear effects. 
To take into account the nonlinearities in AEPs, we estimate a Probit model (Model 2) imposing a quadratic 
to the relation between the response variable and AEPs. In Model 2, all signs and signals are significant in 
explaining the probability of an artwork to be sold.  
As in Model 1, this is an expected result for signs, for which we report joint Wald test of zero restriction at 
the bottom of the model. Even if we do not report the coefficients associated to all signs, we highlight that 
the probability of an artwork to be sold is larger for fabrics, bone and horn items, and artwork from Oceania. 
Focusing on the signals, patina, bibliography, exhibitions, and historicization positively affect the probability 
of an artwork to be sold. Thus, all signals in our model are credible and indicate the quality of artworks. This 
result is consistent with a market separating equilibrium and proves the commercial practice of building the 
reputation of a Tribal artwork through pedigree (signals). In fact, our estimates confirm that the Tribal art 
market, characterized by strong information asymmetries, responds to signals, although with varying intensi-
ty (e.g., the effect of exhibitions is stronger than the effect of historicization, the effect of bibliography is 
stronger than the effect of patina). 
Furthermore, the probability of sale decreases when the auction takes place in Zurich or in Paris. 
As for the AEP, the coefficient associated to the quadratic term is significant, confirming the results of the 
test of non-linearity and suggesting the existence of a dual regime in the effect of AEPs on sales. It is well 
known that partial effects in the binary choice models are complicated functions of the parameters and the 
data. They are even more complicated when  () . F  contains a quadratic term in the covariates: in our case 
( ) ( )( ) j j j j j
j




2 1 2 ' '
'
s s s s f + + + + =
¶
F ¶
  m ν n
β x
. Since the first element on the right hand side of 
the previous expression is always non negative, the level of AEP (our proxy for s ) that minimizes the prob-




1 = - =
s
s
, which corresponds to a price level of  000 , 8 2 e
10.24 @  euros
19. 
Figure 1 offers a graphical representation of this result. 
5 – Price regimes 
Figure 1 suggests that the effect of AEP on the probability of an artwork to be sold is crucial and deserves 
further investigation. In particular, AEP is a “great divide” that splits the Tribal art market in two price re-
gimes. On one side, when AEP is lower than 28,000 euros, we observe a negative relationship between AEP 
and the probability of an artwork to be sold. On the other side, when AEP is higher than 28,000 euros, we 
                                                      
18 More details on binary choice models can be found in Wooldridge (2002) and Verbeek (2008). 
19 If we consider the average difference between the minimum and the maximum auction estimated prices, the range is 
between about 25,000 and 30,000 euros.  
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observe a positive relationship between AEP and the probability of an artwork to be sold
20. The price of 
28,000 euros is too high for the bidders of the low-AEP regime and too low for the bidders of the high-AEP 
regime. Thus, the probability of an artwork to be sold is at its minimum at a price of 28,000 euros. 
However, the model presented in Equation [1], in which the effect of auction estimated price is included only 
through the seller’s reservation price, is not able to explain a positive relationship between AEP and the 
probability of an artwork to be sold (i.e. the right branch of the parabola in Figure 1). For this reason, we 
need a theoretical framework, which is able to explain this finding. 
From a theoretical point of view, the positive relationship between the probability of an artwork to be sold 
and its price can be interpreted using two frameworks: the consumption theory and the investment theory. As 
already noted, the main agents who participate in Tribal art auctions are consumers or investors.  
In the framework of the consumption theory, the positive relationship between price and probability of an 
artwork to be sold could stem from a form of conspicuous consumption that takes effect after a certain price 
threshold is passed. Recent studies, although with different nuances, have applied the conspicuous consump-
tion framework to the art market (Mandel, 2009). Conspicuous consumption has its theoretical roots in Veb-
len (1899)
21 and was formalized for the first time by Leibenstein (1950). Leibenstein abstains from the psy-
chological and sociological consumer motivation to purchase and focuses his attention on the economic 
foundation of the conspicuous consumption (which he also calls “Veblen effect”)
22. Following his frame-
work, the utility of conspicuous consumption may depend positively on prices
23. An excellent survey on con-
spicuous consumption can be found in Mason (1981 and 1998)
24. 
In the framework of the investment theory, the positive relationship between price and probability of an art-
work to be sold could stem from adaptive expectations of investors
25. Two main assumptions are needed for 
this framework to work: that past hammer prices are able to forecast future hammer prices and that auction 
estimated prices incorporate information on past hammer prices. Given these assumptions, an investor’s res-
ervation price may increase if she observes a high auction estimated price. For a given seller’s reservation 
price, this increase in the speculator’s reservation price increases the probability of an artwork to be sold. 
Along these lines of interpretation, we apply the two frameworks described to the Tribal art market. 
According to these frameworks, the bidder’s reservation price can be expressed as a function of the auction 
estimated price
26 (besides signs and signals). Thus, Equation [1] becomes 
                                                      
20 While it is reasonable to assume that sellers are more informed than bidders, nothing can be said about the degree of 
information asymmetry among bidders who belong to the two price regimes. 
21 “But the human proclivity to emulation has seized upon the consumption of goods as a means to an invidious com-
parison, and has thereby invested constable goods with a secondary utility as evidence of relative ability to pay.” (Veb-
len, 1899, p. 155). 
22 “By the Veblen effect we refer to the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption; to the extent to which the demand 
for a consumers’ good is increased because it bears a higher rather than a lower price” (Leibenstein, 1950, p. 189). 
23 The Veblen effect can be analyzed in the framework of signaling game in which the players are the consumers and 
their “social contacts” (Ireland, 1994; Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996). A distinctive feature of conspicuous consumption 
is its visibility, in the sense that the consumption of a conspicuous good should be socially or publicly visible. For a use-
ful insight into the motivations that move collectors to purchase luxury goods to show their wealth or social status see 
Belk (1995). The conspicuous consumption theory has been tested empirically in several experimental analyses (Chao 
and Shor, 1998; Almadoss and Jain, 2005; Basmann et al., 2011). Furthermore, other research, albeit with different the-
oretical perspectives and analytic formalizations, points out that prices may increase the consumer utility directly (Kal-
man, 1968; Hirsch, 1976). Another similar concept introduced by Leibenstein (1950) is the Bandwagon effect. Accord-
ing to Leibenstein, the bandwagon effect influences the agent’s utility through quantity (instead of price): the greater the 
quantity of a good purchased by others, the greater the utility gained by the agent. However, this concept cannot be di-
rectly applied to the Tribal art market that by construction deals with unique works of art (where quantity can only 
equal one). 
24 Some authors have investigated the theory of conspicuous consumption from a psychological and sociological per-
spective. Parsons (1967) points out that spending money appropriately is the crucial problem for the consumers seeking 
to establish themselves in new social groups but prone to choose “the wrong status symbol”. We are grateful to an 
anonymous referee for this evaluable suggestion. 
25 We use the term “investment”, whereas, as an anonymous referee pointed out that “speculation” might better describe 
the transaction of purchasing a piece of art with the hope that it will increase its value, which is indeed taking a gamble 
(Keynes, 1936). Our research did not analyze the price dynamic in the Tribal art market (it is generally difficult to ob-
tain double-sale prices in art markets), therefore we could not directly apply the theory of speculation by Irwin (1937). 
26 It is worth noting that while the conspicuous consumption theory refers to the price of a good, we use the auction es-
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In  Equation  [5],  the auction  estimated  price  enters  the  model  through  the  seller's  reservation  price and 
through the bidder's reservation price. The effect of the auction estimated price on the propensity of an art-
work to be traded in Equation [5] is then more complex than that in Equation [1]. In fact, the estimated price 
is an argument of  jb p , not because it is a sign or signal, but because it is an element of the bidder’s utility. 
Considering Equation [5], the effect of  j s  on 
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Excluding the trivial case in which the auction estimated price does not affect the propensity of an artwork to 
be traded, the marginal effect of  j s  on 
*
j y  can be either positive or negative. In Equation [5], the two price 
regimes can thus stem from a price discrimination that leads to the determination of two sub-markets. 
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In the previous section, we divided the market in two price regimes (a low-AEP regime and a high-AEP re-
gime). However, we cannot separate out the two effects (conspicuous consumption and adaptive expecta-
tions) in the high-AEP regime using the available data. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework presented in 
this section has some testable hypotheses when contextualized within the non-arbitrage theory. 
To avoid arbitrage opportunity between the two sub-markets, we expect the influence of signals in the two 
price regimes to be different. In fact, if different artworks in the two price regimes responded exactly to the 
same signals, it would not be possible for bidders to distinguish among them. Thus, a bidder could buy an 
artwork in the low-AEP regime and sell the same artwork in the high-AEP regime realizing a riskless profit. 
To empirically test the non-arbitrage hypothesis, we split our sample in three parts considering AEP quartiles 
(each quartile contains about 3000 observations): the first quartile includes the low-AEP artworks; the fourth 
quartile contains the high-AEP artworks; the second and the third quartiles are omitted
27. Columns 3-a and 3-
b in Table 2 present Probit regression models estimated on these quartile subsamples. 
Before commenting, we illustrate the two expected results: 
i.  In the “low-AEP regime”, the coefficient of AEP is negative and the probability of an artwork to be 
sold respond to specific signals; 
ii.  In the “high-AEP regime”, the coefficient of AEP is positive and the probability of an artwork to be 
sold respond to other specific signals. 
In the first case (low-AEP regime), AEP is indeed significant and its effect on the response variable is nega-
tive. Thus, in this regime, Tribal artworks are ordinary goods and bidders have standard utility functions. 
This is in line with a standard economic framework, in which the bidder’s utility is negatively affected by an 
increase in AEP. In this regime, bibliography and exhibitions are not significant. Within the low-AEP group, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
ante probability of an artwork to be sold and then the only available price is the auction estimated price. The hammer 
price, instead, is only available ex-post (after the auction takes place) if and only if the artwork is certainly sold. As pre-
viously mentioned, however, auction estimated prices and hammer prices are highly correlated. 
27 We expect the AEP coefficient to change sign in these quartiles.  
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the problem for the bidder is to recognize the antiquity
28 of an artwork. Antiquity is indicated by patina and 
historicization. They are accepted signals of quality, because the former is a “proof of a genuine use in time” 
and the latter is an explicit certification of age. On the other hand, bibliography and exhibitions may be sig-
nals produced with virtually no cost, because they may be of low-standards. Thus, they are pooling signals 
that do not convey any information on the quality of an artwork. 
In the second case (high-AEP regime), AEP is significant and its effect on the response variable is positive. 
Thus, in this regime, some form of conspicuous consumption or investor adaptive expectation is present and 
bidders have non-standard utility functions that depend on auction estimated prices (besides signs and sig-
nals). In this regime, the problem shifts from antiquity to notoriety. In this case, patina is a pooling signal, 
because most artwork may have a patina. Thus, this signal, important for low-AEP artworks, does not really 
make the difference in certifying the quality in high-AEP regime. However, bibliography and exhibitions 
further  increase the  reputation  of  an  artwork,  because  they  are  signals  reserved  for  notorious  artworks. 
Hence, they are an authoritative source of information that further increases the reputation of an artwork. In 
fact, these artworks are included in high-level exhibitions and publications, characterized by high costs. His-
toricization plays a role also in this regime, since this variable certifies both the antiquity and notoriety. The 
difference between the coefficients in the two regimes for this variable (0.252 - 0.157 = 0.096) is not statisti-
cally different from zero (z-value = 0.996, p-value = 0.324), according to the results of a threshold model
29. 
In order to interpret the quantitative implications of our results, we calculate partial effects for signs and sig-
nals for both regimes (values are in columns next to the corresponding models: on the right of Model 3-a for 
the low-AEP regime and on the right of Model 3-b for the high-AEP regime). We compute marginal effects 
for continuous explanatory variables and average effects for binary explanatory variables. The interpretation 
is straightforward and therefore we omit a detailed discussion. 
In conclusion, the results of our empirical test show that the two price regimes respond to different signals. 
Thus, the non-arbitrage hypothesis seems to be supported by the data. 
6 – Robustness checks 
After having presented the main results, we report some remarks and robustness checks that apply to all 
models. 
At the bottom of each column, we report a Wald test statistics, to test for the hypothesis that all coefficients 
in the model except the intercept are equal to zero (Regression – Chi-squared). All the test statistics strongly 
reject the hypothesis that the conditional mean is constant and independent of the explanatory variables. 
We estimate also Linear Probability models and Logit models. This corresponds to a different choice of the 
function  () . F  The results of these specifications are similar to those reported. This is a usual finding: typical-
ly, the different models do not provide different qualitative answers. 
Furthermore, we would like to highlight that all our inference results are double-checked with both bootstrap 
and jackknife standard errors.  
For each model, we also report two goodness-of-fit measures. Let  1 log L  denote the maximum loglikelihood 
value of the model of interest and let  0 logL  denote the value of the loglikelihood function in an only-
intercept model, then the McFadden’s pseudo R-squared is defined as  0 1 log log 1 L L - , while the pseudo 




- . Both measures can only take on values in the interval 
[0, 1]. The two measures take on low values in our models. This is a quite common result in case of binary 
response models. 
To assess the goodness-of-fit in an alternative way, we construct a cross-tabulation of predictions and actual 
observations (confusion matrix). In Table 3, we report a confusion matrix for the Model 2 in Table 2. Even 
these results suggest that the prediction accuracy may be significantly improved. A semiparametric binary 
response model may have a better performance in terms of goodness-of-fit with respects to our Probit model. 
                                                      
28 Antiquity does not indicate the age of the artwork, which is virtually irrelevant in Tribal Art, but the evidence that it 
does not belong to the category of touristic or street art. 
29 In a threshold model, the covariates are partitioned into ranges according to a threshold variable. In our analysis, the 
threshold variable is a dummy which equals one in case of high-AEP. We do not report the results because they are 
identical to those of the two separate models by construction.  
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Instead of choosing  () . F  to be the standard normal distribution function, we can adopt the Klein and Spady 
(1993) approach to estimate  () . F  via kernel methods. In this way, we obtain a semiparametric maximum 
likelihood estimator for our binary response model (Li and Racine, 2007; Kleiber and Zeileis, 2008). The re-
sulting confusion matrix, reported in Table 3, may be compared with the confusion matrix of the original 
Probit model. This comparison shows that the semiparametric model has worse performance in terms of cor-
rect classification ratio for both overall and traded artworks, but better performance in case of non-traded 
artworks. Thus, the results do not justify the adoption of a semiparametric approach. 
7 – Conclusions 
The Tribal art market is a complex market, which lacks an efficient information system. In this paper, using a 
new database consisting of all auction results in the last ten years, we analyze the characteristics of this mar-
ket, which by definition operates in a condition of asymmetric information. In this market, signs and signals 
may indicate the quality of the artwork and drive the supply and the demand, and thus the marketability of 
the Tribal artwork. 
Given the peculiarities of the Tribal art market, we ask if some form of conspicuous consumption and inves-
tor adaptive expectation drives this market. We address this question presenting and testing a model for the 
marketability of an artwork. We base our empirical analysis on a unique hand-collected dataset, which com-
prises the major worldwide Tribal art market auctions between 1999 and 2008. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. 
i.  There is a significant relationship between the probability of an artwork to be sold and its signs 
(Continent effect, item effect, material effect), signals (patina, bibliography, exhibitions, historiciza-
tion), and AEP; 
ii.  The effect of AEPs on the probability of sale is nonlinear and gives rise to a dual AEP regime; 
iii.  In a low-AEP regime, bidders have standard utility functions and Tribal artworks are ordinary goods; 
iv.  In a high-AEP regime, bidders have non-standard utility functions that depend on auction estimated 
prices, and some form of conspicuous consumption or investor adaptive expectation drives the mar-
ket; 
v.  Not all signals are equally important in the two regimes (patina is more important in the low-AEP 
regime; bibliography and exhibitions are more important in the high-AEP regime), thus simple arbi-
trage opportunities cannot exist. 
vi.  Historicization is relevant in both regimes. 
After having separated the Tribal art market into two price regimes in which the non-arbitrage hypothesis 
holds, immediate policy implications for sellers emerge. If an artwork belongs to the low-AEP regime, its 
probability to be sold decreases with the auction estimated price. If an artwork belongs to the high-AEP re-
gime, its probability to be sold increases with the auction estimated price. Sellers could exploit these evi-
dences to maximize their probability to sell their artworks
30. The seller and the auction houses could thus 
“manipulate” (Irwin, 1937; Hirshleifer, 1977) the auction estimated price to increase their artwork probabil-
ity to be sold. However, pushing this behavior too far would be detrimental to the auction house credibility
31 
and the Tribal art market to lose its “appeal” to collectors and investors. 
The main drawback of this paper is that we use the auction results (traded vs. non-traded) as a proxy for the 
marketability of an artwork. If we could observe the sellers and buyers’ reservation prices, our analysis 
would benefit from a primary information source. However, this information is unobtainable for the whole 
market. Further analysis may collect data from a restricted panel of bidders and sellers to deepen our under-
standing of Tribal art market. Questionnaires and interviews may be useful for this purpose. Of course, these 
data would require a different analysis methodology (e.g. discrete choice models). 
It remains to be proven whether signals and two price regimes are a specific feature of Tribal art or a charac-
teristic of art in general. In fact, signals may have special importance in Ancient art where, apart from origi-
                                                      
30 Using the example of Damien Hirst’s sculpture of a shark, Thompson (2008) argues that Contemporary art prices are 
strongly influenced by branding strategies. However, Graddy (2009) argues that there is no way to empirically deter-
mine whether “Hirst’s work is important and expensive because he has branded himself or whether he has become a 
“brand” because his work is important and expensive”. Branding strategies are also identifiable in Tribal art auction 
catalogs, where they are generally applied to high-price regime artworks. 
31 The literature on auctions shows that there are several reasons for auctioneers and sellers to provide truthful infor-
mation about an artwork (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2010).  
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nal paintings of great masters, it is difficult to retrieve the historical background of an artwork. Instead, it 
may be that the hypothesis of conspicuous consumption is appropriate for both Modern and Contemporary 
art, where collectors usually compete for million-dollar pieces of artwork. 
Finally, with regard to a future extension of this research, we could verify whether the variables that affect 
the prices are the same that affect the probability of sale of Tribal artworks. In fact, to the best of our 
knowledge, the previous studies have only investigated which variables explain the prices of Tribal artwork 
but no one has ever verified whether the explanatory variables are the same. Work is currently underway to 
provide such empirical study. 
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Figure 1 – Non linearity in the seller’s reservation price along with 95-percent confidence interval around the 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics (part A) 
Variable  No  Yes  Freq. No  Freq. Yes 
Traded  3707  8104  0.314  0.686 
Patina  6274  5537  0.531  0.469 
Bibliography  6638  5173  0.562  0.438 
Exhibitions  10482  1329  0.887  0.113 
Historicization  3053  8758  0.258  0.742 
  Mean  Median  SD   
AEP  8.365  8.370  1.428    
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics (part B) 
Variable    Count  Freq. 
Venue  Paris  4998  0.423 
  Zurich  969  0.082 
  New York  5844  0.495 
Continent  Africa  7708  0.653 
  America  3444  0.292 
  Eurasia  177  0.015 
  Oceania  482  0.041 
Item  Clothes  173  0.015 
  Weapons  218  0.018 
  Furniture  368  0.031 
  Sticks  357  0.030 
  Jewels  244  0.021 
  Masks  2059  0.174 
  Ritual Items  838  0.071 
  Ornaments  820  0.069 
  Sculptures  4162  0.352 
  Musical instruments  229  0.019 
  Fabrics  241  0.020 
  Tools  2102  0.178 
Material  Silver  104  0.009 
  Ivory  443  0.038 
  Shell  42  0.004 
  Vegetal fiber, paper, down  147  0.012 
  Wood  6966  0.590 
  Metal  555  0.047 
  Gold  409  0.035 
  Bone/horn  78  0.007 
  Stone  470  0.040 
  Precious stone  369  0.031 
  Terracotta/ceramics  1745  0.148 
  Fabric and hides  483  0.041 
Year  1998  943  0.080 
  1999  739  0.063 
  2000  1038  0.088 
  2001  416  0.035 
  2002  677  0.057 
  2003  1261  0.107 
  2004  1324  0.112 
  2005  1312  0.111 
  2006  1229  0.104 
  2007  1060  0.090 
  2008  1301  0.110 




Table 2 – Regression analysis (Bold indicates significant at least at 10% level) 
Response Variable: traded(yes = 1)             
Covariates  Probit (1)  Probit (2)  Probit low AEPs (3-a)  Partial effects  Probit high AEPs (3-b)  Partial effects 
Intercept  1.186  4.845  2.634  -  -0.740  - 
  (0.225)  (0.409)  (0.474)    (0.792)   
Signals             
Patina (yes = 1)  0.046  0.064  0.139  0.038  0.089  0.031 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.078)    (0.074)   
Bibliography (yes = 1)  0.139  0.116  0.090  0.024  0.197  0.070 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.070)    (0.057)   
Exhibitions (yes = 1)  0.232  0.201  0.111  0.029  0.260  0.088 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.132)    (0.066)   
Historicization (yes = 1)  0.132  0.140  0.157  0.043  0.252  0.091 
  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.060)    (0.075)   
AEP  -0.163  -1.046  -0.372  -0.102  0.089  0.031 
  (0.011)  (0.082)  (0.044)    (0.033)   
AEP^2  -  0.051  -  -  -  - 
    (0.005)         
Signs             
Continent effect (Chi-squared)  39.417  47.923  9.487  -  7.017  - 
Item effect (Chi-squared)  42.760  35.943  32.009  -  19.145  - 
Material effect (Chi-squared)  25.239  26.624  23.291  -  8.446  - 
Control variables             
Venue (Paris vs. NY)  -0.032  -0.089  -0.280  -0.063  -0.135  -0.047 
  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.125)    (0.063)   
Venue (Zurich vs. NY)  -0.755  -0.864  -1.290  -0.397  -0.557  -0.205 
  (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.156)    (0.194)   
Year effect (Chi-squared)  158.280  143.090  40.935  -  75.462  - 
Regression (Chi-squared)  729.100  806.450  305.520  -  203.050  - 
Nonlinearities in AEPs (Chi-squared)  142.330  -  -  -  -  - 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2  0.052  0.061  0.101  -  0.055  - 
Pseudo-R2  0.061  0.070  0.028  -  0.018  -  
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Table 3 – Confusion matrix 
  Predicted (Probit)   
Actual  Traded  Non-traded  Total 
Traded  448  3259  3707 
Non-traded  302  7802  8104 
Total  750  11061  11811 
Overall correct classification ratio  0.699     
Correctly classified by outcome (Actual = 1)  0.121     
Correctly classified by outcome (Actual = 0)  0.963     
       
  Predicted (semiparametric model)   
Actual  Traded  Non-traded  Total 
Traded  262  3445  3707 
Non-traded  189  7915  8104 
Total  451  11360  11811 
Overall correct classification ratio  0.692     
Correctly classified by outcome (Actual = 1)  0.071     
Correctly classified by outcome (Actual = 0)  0.977     
 